Moral Relativism vs. Moral Absolutism

And interesting accusation that I often here touted in order to denigrate specific ethical systems is that said system, unwittingly or not, permits of moral relativism. Moral relativism is a concept I would like to think is rejected by the majority of thinkers, even if only due to the reason that such an extreme position deprives the one who holds it for the grounds too say that they’re in the right, a deprivation for which most ego’s will not stand. But the compassionate realize that the extremes of moral relativism are unacceptable due to its inevitable theoretical outcomes, such as that Nazism is no better than altruism.

Although to think so is, perhaps, to exhibit a rather foolish level of optimism, I would like to assume that most thinkers, despite their many disagreements on other matters, would be inclined to believe that sneaking into a house at night in order to stab a baby for personal satisfaction is a bad thing. Let us suppose for a moment that my optimism is not too far off the mark and further more that the condemnation of such a behavior requires some philosophy other than the most extreme form of moral relativism. Why, then, is the charge of moral relativism so often waged against opponents? Are there different types of moral relativism? If one is disinclined to think that morals are absolute, does it follow that one must permit of any action, or contradict oneself?

I think that approaches to ethics are mistakenly thought by some to be either of two extremes—moral relativism or moral absolutism. I believe that ethics is a great deal more complicated than this. First of all, the rejection of a dogmatic or axiomatic approach to ethics does not entail the acceptance of moral relativism. For example, many conservative Christians seem to see moral relativism in the rejection of universal condemnation of all abortions. In reality, though, it is entirely consistent to hold to a notion of objective moral truths without calling a specific category of acts inherently good or bad—perhaps such acts can be objectively good or objectively bad depending on the scenario. In a way, one has the option of seeing objective ethics not as a large dogmatic block, but as a fractal pattern or ever more subtle nuanced situations and particular cases. One certainly needn’t entertain the wholesale rejection or acceptance of every conceivable category of actions in order reject moral relativism.