Consciousness, Self, and Philosophy of Mind

I’ve been interested in philosophy of mind lately. Truth be told, I find it to be a very difficult subject to think clearly about. I think that this difficulty is, perhaps, a consequence of the recursive nature of self-consciousness. Recursion in general seems to give rise to a certain level of vagueness and confusion, and care is needed to be as precise as one can be. Conscious seems to be particularly enigmatic—at once ever-present and elusive. Before dealing with the nature of its existence and its relations with other things, one would think that it would first be necessary to get an idea of what consciousness is, and what exact ally it is that we’re dealing with. Unfortunately, this first step is one of the most the most complicated aspects of philosophy of mind—the first step is the trickiest.

Many philosophers of mind refer to subjectively experienced components of existence as “qualia”. Subjective experiences such as brown, happy, and cold are all examples of qualia. Qualia, however, has quite a bit of controversy attached to it however. Some philosophers, such as Daniel Dennett, deny the existence of qualia altogether, denying that it as something substantial that need be accounted for by a theory of consciousness. Other philosophers of mind, such as David Chalmers, think that this amounts to trying to solve a problem by ignoring it. According to the introduction to his book, Chalmers considers it quite obvious that consciousness exists and needs to be explained. I’m not so sure, personally.

I wonder if it’s possible that what we call consciousness is not something inherently different from the physical, but instead a particular facet or face of the physical world, a subsection of the material if you will. This fits in well with many Buddhist elements of consciousness—the illusory nature of the self. There would be not necessity of an observer—what we call subjective experience is just a particular facet of physical existence. Although I think that this is a possibility, I’m by no means convinced that this is the case either. Bertrand Russell once said that a theory of matter must be strange, regardless of how it’s made. I think that the same goes for a theory of consciousness. It’s bizarre to think that consciousness could arise from matter, but equally bizarre to think that matter consciousness is completely separate from matter. Bizarre no matter which way it arises, really.

I’ve been thinking through an interesting consequence of the theory that our minds are not any different than a biological computer. I want to write down my thoughts on the matter before I read more about Chalmers hypothetical panpsychism, for I believe that it might be similar. My own hypothetical runs as follows. Let’s say that our minds are not inherently different from a computer, and that the brain is something roughly similar to a biological circuit board. Now surely, if a biological computer can give rise to consciousness, then a silicon computer can as well. But why stop there? I could easily make a Turing machine with a collection of stones, my own hands, and some instructions. Now, this would be terribly inconvenient, but it is theoretically possible. Well, if I can make a computer out of stones, and if computers can become conscious, than why can’t a mind be made out of stone, carrots, or Brussels sprouts?

Now, in the examples I have mentioned, I have been part of the machine, my hands moving the objects, considering them as discrete elements of data. But is my conscious self an essential component of such a created mind? This is the most pressing question. You see, when a computer adds, there is no evidence that it realizes that is adding. But if consciousness is not necessary to perceive information as discrete binary components, then couldn’t anything be conscious? From ant colonies to fields of asteroids.